Software Provision and the Impact of Market Integration by Iwasa, Kazumichi & Kikuchi, Toru
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Software Provision and the Impact of
Market Integration
Kazumichi Iwasa and Toru Kikuchi
Kobe University, Kobe University
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10982/
MPRA Paper No. 10982, posted 9. October 2008 09:20 UTC
Software Provisio and
the Impact of Market Integration: A Note
Kazumichi Iwasa∗and Toru Kikuchi†‡
March 3, 2008
Abstract
Both deeper market integration and advances in digital technology
have driven particularly large decreases in the costs of intermarket
software provision. In this note, we first explain the mechanism of
how trade costs influence the software provision decisions of software
firms. Then, we investigate the transformation of production/trade
patterns given gradually decreasing trade costs for software products.
It is shown that, if two incompatible types of hardware exist, deeper
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market integration may reduce the variety of hardware technologies.
It is also shown that, if the variety of hardware technologies is reduced
by deeper integration, some consumers are made worse off. In other
words, deeper market integration, which forms the basis for easier ac-
cess to software products, may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior
outcomes.
Key Words: software provision; indirect network effects; hardware/software
systems; market integration; Pareto inferior outcome
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1 Introduction
Two of the most important trends in the global economy in recent decades
have been (1) the dramatic increase in the role of information-intensive prod-
ucts (e.g., various types of computer software products and IT-related ser-
vices) in economic activity, and (2) the decline in intermarket transaction
costs such as transport and communications costs. Both deepening market
integration and advances in digital technology have driven particularly large
decreases in the costs of intermarket software provision. Lower costs have
been associated with a growing connectivity of individuals and organizations
achieved through improved communications networks (e.g., the Internet and
the satellite communications networks) and a consequent increase in the flow
of information-intensive software provision across markets.1
Since these changes due to deeper market integration often provide an
opportunity to acquire a variety of products not available from domestic
producers, welfare gains via increased product diversification are emphasized
in the trade/regional economy literature.2 As yet, however, little attention
has been paid to the impact of market integration on software provision in
the presence of indirect network effects.
1Addressing this point, Illing and Peitz (2006) presented stylized facts on software
industries.
2See, for example, Fujita et al. (1999) and Behrens et al. (2007).
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Indirect network effects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in
the variety of complementary “software” products available for a “hardware”
device. Examples of such devices include personal computers, video cassette
recorders, and consumer electronics products. It is important to note that not
only electronic products but also IT-related services exhibit strong indirect
network effects. Internet auction sites such as eBay provide a good example:
the more users sell through eBay (“hardware” in our terminology), the greater
the variety of items (“software” in our terminology) that can be found, and
the greater the value of buying through eBay. These examples suggest that
the concept of indirect network effects has wide applicability in the modern
economy.
Despite the fact that many industries have indirect network effects that
are supported by deeper market integration, the literature on indirect net-
work effects is almost exclusively focused on a single market.3 Because the
role of indirect network effects is amplified in the globalized world, it seems
important to explore the impact of market integration in the presence of
3The seminal contributions on the role of a “hardware/software” system are Chou and
Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992). See Economides (1996), Gandal (2002), Farrell
and Klemperer (2007) for surveys of the relevant literature. In the international context,
Gandal and Shy (2001) analyze governments’ incentives to recognize foreign standards
when there are network effects. See, also, Kikuchi (2003, 2007) for an analysis of trade
liberalization in the presence of network effects.
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products with indirect network effects.
As our primary contribution, we extend Church and Gandal (1992)’s
single market model with two incompatible types of hardware to an inter-
national (or regional) trade environment with two markets:4 we emphasize
the role of intermarket trade costs which includes not only shipping costs but
also difficulty of communication, information barriers, etc., and show how
deeper market integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs) affects the soft-
ware provision decision of software firms.5 It is shown that, given that two
incompatible types of hardware exist, deeper market integration may reduce
the variety of hardware technologies. It is also shown that, if the variety of
hardware technologies is reduced by deeper integration, some consumers are
made worse off. In other words, deeper market integration, which forms the
basis for easier access to software products (i.e., intensified indirect network
effects), may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior outcomes.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
4Based on Hotelling’s spatial approach, Schmitt (1993, 1995) investigates the product
choices made by firms in a two-market environment. Also, in order to analyze the possi-
bility of coalition formation among suppliers of retail services, Henkel et al. (2000) adapt
the work of Church and Gandal (1992) to a spatial economy setting.
5Recent empirical studies suggest that trade costs are still high, even aside from trade-
policy barriers and even between apparently highly integrated economies. See Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) for surveys of the relevant literature.
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model. Section 3 analyzes trading equilibrium and Section 4 considers the
impact of deeper market integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs). Section
5 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the basic setup of the model: both technology and
consumers’ preferences are specified. Then, in the next section, the trading
equilibrium with positive transport costs is explained in detail.
Suppose that there are two countries (or regions), Home and Foreign,
and that they are identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology.6 In each
country there are three types of goods: hardware, a large variety of software
products, and the outside good. We assume that there are two hardware
technologies in both countries: Hardware 0 and Hardware 1. We also assume
that the hardware technologies are incompatible: software written for one
hardware device will not work with the other available hardware. Without
the provision of compatible software, no consumers will purchase a hardware
device.
A market in each country is defined as a line of unit length representing
both consumers’ set of preferences and the firms’ attribute space for hard-
ware products. The characterization of the two hardware technologies is
6In this way, we rule out Ricardian comparative advantage.
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exogenous: each is located at the end point of the unit line: let Hardware 0’s
technology be at the left end point and Hardware 1’s technology at the right
end point. We denote the marginal cost of each hardware production by c.
We further assume that the hardware technologies are non-proprietary and
that they will be offered at marginal cost.
Following Church and Gandal (1992), consumer preferences over the com-
bination of hardware and software are modeled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) CES
utility function. We assume that the distribution of the tastes of Home (For-
eign) consumers is uniform along a line of unit length s ∈ [0, 1]. In each
country, the consumers’ density is uniform and equal to 1.
The preferences of a consumer of type s for system h (h = 0, 1) are:
U(s, h) =
 nh∑
i
(xhi )
θ +
nh∗∑
i∗
(xhi∗)
θ
(1/θ) + φ− k|s− h|, (1/2) < θ < 1, (1)
where nh (nh∗) is the number of Home (resp. Foreign) software products
written for Hardware h, xhi (resp. x
h
i∗) is the level of consumption of software
product i (resp. i∗) written for Hardware h, σ ≡ 1/(1 − θ) > 2 is the
elasticity of substitution between every pair of software products, and we
assume that φ > k. k is a measure of the degree of product differentiation
between the hardware technologies: the greater k, the greater the degree of
differentiation.
Intermarket trade in software products is inhibited by frictional trade
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barriers, which are modeled as iceberg costs a` la Samuelson: for one unit of
the software product to reach the other country (or region), t ∈ (1,∞) units
must be shipped.7 Thus, the price of an imported software product to Home
consumers will be tph∗ , where p
h
∗ is the producer’s price for software products
manufactured in Foreign. Intermarket trade cost includes all impediments
to trade, such as shipping costs per se, but also different product standards,
difficulty of communication, information barriers and cultural differences.
The representative consumer in Home who purchases Hardware h will
maximize (??) subject to the following budget constraint:
nh∑
i
phi x
h
i +
nh∗∑
i∗
tphi∗x
h
i∗ = e− c, (2)
where phi (resp. p
h
i∗) is the price of Home (resp. Foreign) software variety i
(resp. i∗) for Hardware h, e is the total expenditure allocated to hardware
and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost) of a unit of Hardware h.
The solution to this problem consists of the following demand functions:
xhi = (e− c)(P h)σ−1/(phi )σ, (3)
xhi∗ = (e− c)(P h)σ−1/(tphi∗)σ, (4)
where
P h =
 nh∑
j
(phj )
1−σ
+
nh∗∑
j∗
(tphj∗)
1−σ
1/(1−σ). (5)
7See Ottaviano and Thisse (2004, p.2581).
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Similarly, we obtain the demand functions of each consumer in Foreign
who purchases Hardware h as follows.
yhi = (e− c)(P h∗ )σ−1/(tphi )σ, (6)
yhi∗ = (e− c)(P h∗ )σ−1/(phi∗)σ, (7)
where
P h∗ =
 nh∑
j
(tphj )
1−σ
+
nh∗∑
j∗
(phj∗)
1−σ
1/(1−σ). (8)
If the prices of software product are identical among countries (i.e., phi =
phi∗ = p
h), the CES price indices (??) and (??) simplify to
P h = ph(nh + τnh∗)
1/(1−σ)
and P h∗ = p
h(τnh + nh∗)
1/(1−σ)
, (9)
where τ ≡ t1−σ ∈ (0, 1) is the measure of the freeness of trade, which increases
as t falls and is equal to one when trade is costless (t = 1). Note that τ can
be interpreted as a ‘weight’ on imported software products: the price index
is decreasing in τ .
Then, the indirect utility of a type-s consumer in Home who purchases a
system h is
V (s, h) =
(nh + τnh∗)
1/(σ−1)
(e− c)
ph
+ φ− k|s− h|. (10)
On the other hand, the indirect utility of a type-s consumer in Foreign who
purchases a system h is given by
V∗(s, h) =
(τnh + nh∗)
1/(σ−1)
(e− c)
ph
+ φ− k|s− h|. (11)
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The indirect utility functions are concave in (nh + τnh∗) or (τn
h + nh∗): the
marginal benefit of additional software variety is decreasing.
Now, let us turn to the cost structure of software provision. The tech-
nology for the production of software is characterized by increasing returns
to scale, since software creation typically involves fixed costs. We denote the
constant marginal cost of software production for every product by b, and
the software development cost by f .
We assume that software firms are monopolistic competitors. With the
total number of products available to consumers being very large, each pro-
ducer chooses its constant markup prices as:8
p = p∗ = bσ/(σ − 1). (12)
3 Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we specify a simple game in which the strategy of each soft-
ware firm is a decision to provide software for either hardware, 0 or 1. The
timing of the game is as follows:9 In the first stage software firms enter the
industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software firms
have rational expectations. Let us denote the free-entry numbers of software
firms in Home and Foreign by N and N∗, respectively, that is, N = n0 + n1
8Hereafter, we drop the superscript h.
9This is taken from Church and Gandal’s (1992) single market model.
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and N∗ = n0∗ + n
1
∗. Although there may be more than one equilibrium soft-
ware configuration, we show that the sum of N and N∗ is unique,10 which
we denote by 2NF . Also, in order to emphasize the role of trade costs, we
restrict our attention to the case of symmetric equilibrium where nh = nh∗
and N = N∗ = NF hold. In other words, we concentrate on the case where
each country’s equilibrium configuration is identical. From the consumers’
viewpoint, this implies that the effective number of software varieties for
Hardware h is (1 + τ)nh [see equations (??) and (??)].
In the second stage, software firms simultaneously choose which platform
to provide software for. In the final stage, each consumer purchases either a
Hardware 0 or a Hardware 1 system and some of the compatible software.
We solve this problem backward.
3.1 Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are
equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase
considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each
system. From (??), a Home consumer located at s purchases Hardware 0 if
10See Subsection 3.3.
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the following inequality holds:
(n0 + τn0∗)
1/(σ−1)
(e− c)
p
+ φ− ks
>
[NF − n0 + τ(NF − n0∗)]1/(σ−1)(e− c)
p
+ φ− k(1− s), (13)
where use has been made of the equation n0 +n1 = n0∗+n
1
∗ = NF . Therefore,
the location of the marginal consumer who purchases Hardware 0 is given by
a function of (n0, n0∗), that is,
s(n0, n0∗)
=
{(n0 + τn0∗)1/(σ−1) − [(1 + τ)NF − (n0 + τn0∗)]1/(σ−1)}(e− c)(σ − 1)
2kbσ
+
1
2
.
(14)
And it can be easily shown that the first derivatives of s(n0, n0∗) with respect
to n0 and n0∗ are positive. This means that the share of Hardware 0 is
increasing in the amount of software available for it.
Similarly, the location of the marginal consumer in Foreign who purchases
Hardware 0 is given by
s∗(n0, n0∗)
=
{(τn0 + n0∗)1/(σ−1) − [(1 + τ)NF − (τn0 + n0∗)]1/(σ−1)}(e− c)(σ − 1)
2kbσ
+
1
2
.
(15)
Clearly, in the case of n0 = n0∗, the location of the marginal consumer in each
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country is identical and given by a function of n0, that is,
S(n0) ≡ s(n0, n0)
= T (τ)
[(n0)
1/(σ−1) − (NF − n0)1/(σ−1)](e− c)(σ − 1)
2kbσ
+
1
2
, (16)
where
T (τ) ≡ (1 + τ)1/(σ−1). (17)
Then, the first derivative of S(n0) is given by
S ′(n0) ≡ dS(n
0)
dn0
=
T (τ)[(n0)
(2−σ)/(σ−1)
+ (NF − n0)(2−σ)/(σ−1)](e− c)
2kbσ
> 0.
(18)
It can also be shown that
S(0) ≥ 0 and S(NF ) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ [(1 + τ)NF ]1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e−c)(σ−1)]
(19)
and
S ′(NF/2) ≥ 1/NF ⇐⇒ [(1 + τ)NF ]1/(σ−1) ≥ 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e− c).
(20)
Based on the above, the function S(n0) can be depicted as curves in Figure
1,11 where curves A, B, and C correspond to the graph of S(n0) under each
of the following three cases: in case A, t ≥ t¯ ≡ [NF/(N −NF )]1/(σ−1), where
11The second derivative of S(n0) is negative (positive) if n0 is smaller (greater) than
13
N ≡ {kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)]}σ−1; in caseB, t¯ > t > t ≡ [NF/(N¯ −NF )]1/(σ−1),
where N¯ ≡ 2[kbσ/2(e− c)]σ−1; and in case C, t ≤ t.12 Note that
t¯ ∈ (1,∞) ⇐⇒ N/2 < NF < N,
t ∈ (1,∞) ⇐⇒ N¯/2 < NF < N¯.
Since N is smaller than N¯ , we can conclude that
1 < t < t¯ <∞ ⇐⇒ N¯/2 < NF < N,
where N¯/2 < N holds if σ ∈ (2, 3). The three curves are drawn for high,
intermediate, and low levels of intermarket trade costs, respectively.
Note that in cases B and C, S(n0) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are
still two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, there exists
a critical number of software firms for each type of hardware such that if
the number of software firms for one technology exceeds the critical number,
then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other hand,
in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one type of hardware is
standardized; no software for the other hardware exists.13
NF /2, since
d2S(n0)
d(n0)2
= −T (τ)[(n
0)(3−2σ)/(σ−1) − (NF − n0)(3−2σ)/(σ−1)](σ − 2)(e− c)
2kbσ(σ − 1) ,
where σ > 2 from the assumption θ > 1/2.
12The importance of discriminating between case B and C will appear in the following.
13Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and pro-
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3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, software firms simultaneously select the network which
they will supply software to. Given the marginal consumer in Home and
Foreign, s and s∗, respectively, and the number of competing software firms
in each country, (n0, n0∗) or (n
1, n1∗), the profit of a Home firm writing software
for Hardware 0 is
pi0 = s(p− b)x0 + s∗(tpy0 − bty0)− f
=
e− c
σ
(
s
n0 + τn0∗
+ τ
s∗
τn0 + n0∗
)
− f, (21)
where x0 = (e − c)/[(n0 + τn0∗)p] and y0 = (e − c)/[tσ(τn0 + n0∗)p]. Note
that, due to the presence of intermarket trade costs, profits from exporting,
s∗/(τn0 + n0∗), is discounted by a weight τ . The profit of a Home firm for
Hardware 1 is
pi1 = (1− s)(p− b)x1 + (1− s∗)(tpy1 − bty1)− f
=
e− c
σ
(
1− s
n1 + τn1∗
+ τ
1− s∗
τn1 + n1∗
)
− f, (22)
where x1 = (e− c)/[(n1 + τn1∗)p] and y1 = (e− c)/[tσ(τn1 + n1∗)p].
Similarly, we can show that the profits of each Foreign firm writing soft-
ware for Hardware 0 and Hardware 1, which we denote by pi0∗ and pi
1
∗, respec-
vides no stand-alone benefits, in case A, the marginal consumer in each country changes
discontinuously to 0 or 1 when n0 and n0∗ are equal to 0 or NF .
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tively, are given by
pi0∗ =
e− c
σ
(
τ
s
n0 + τn0∗
+
s∗
τn0 + n0∗
)
− f, (23)
pi1∗ =
e− c
σ
(
τ
1− s
n1 + τn1∗
+
1− s∗
τn1 + n1∗
)
− f. (24)
From these equations, it is easily derived that if n0 = n0∗ and s = s∗, then
pih = pih∗ (h = 0, 1) and
pi0
>
<
pi1 ⇐⇒ s >
<
n0
NF
. (25)
Based on the latter inequality, each firm considers whether S(n0) is greater
than n0/NF or not, and then chooses the network which they will supply
software to.
3.3 First Stage
Since we focus attention on the case of symmetric equilibrium where nh = nh∗ ,
we consider only two cases: case (i) nh and nh∗ (h = 0, 1) are positive; case
(ii) n0 = N and n0∗ = N∗ or n
1 = N and n1∗ = N∗.
At any equilibrium where two networks coexist both in Home and Foreign,
pi0 = pi1 and pi0∗ = pi
1
∗ must be satisfied. Therefore, in case (i), we can show
from (??)-(??) that
s =
n0 + τn0∗
N + τN∗
and s∗ =
τn0 + n0∗
τN +N∗
, (26)
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and then
pi0 = pi1 =
e− c
σ
(
1
N + τN∗
+
τ
τN +N∗
)
− f (27)
and
pi0∗ = pi
1
∗ =
e− c
σ
(
τ
N + τN∗
+
1
τN +N∗
)
− f. (28)
On the other hand, in case (ii), all software firms provide software for one net-
work at equilibrium. Therefore, (s, s∗, n0, n0∗) = (1, 1, N,N∗) or (s, s∗, n
1, n1∗) =
(0, 0, N,N∗) holds. Then, from (??)-(??), we obtain
pi0 or pi1 =
e− c
σ
(
1
N + τN∗
+
τ
τN +N∗
)
− f (29)
and
pi0∗ or pi
1
∗ =
e− c
σ
(
τ
N + τN∗
+
1
τN +N∗
)
− f. (30)
Thus, in each country, the profit of each firm is independent of equilibrium
software configurations. Since the free-entry prevails both in Home and For-
eign, we can conclude that
N = N∗ =
e− c
fσ
, (31)
that is, the free-entry number of firms in each country is uniquely given as14
NF ≡ (e− c)
fσ
. (32)
14In any other cases, for example, n0 = N and n1∗ = N∗, we can show that free entry in
each country implies N +N∗ = 2NF .
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Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that pi0 = pi1 = 0
holds for any pair (s, n0) on the dotted line in Figure 1, pi0 = 0 at (1, NF ),
and pi1 = 0 at (0, 0), while pi0 (pi1) is positive (negative) at any pair above
the line and vice versa.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium Configurations
First, from (??), the first derivative of pi0 with respect to n0 is given by
∂pi0
∂n0
=
e− c
σ
[
1
n0 + τn0∗
(
∂s
∂n0
− s
n0 + τn0∗
)
+
τ
τn0 + n0∗
(
∂s∗
∂n0
− τs∗
τn0 + n0∗
)]
.
Evaluating this derivative at n0 = n0∗ and s = s∗ = n
0/NF yields
∂pi0
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
s=s∗=n0/NF
=
e− c
σ(1 + τ)2n0
[
(1 + τ)
∂s
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
− 1
NF
+ τ 2
(
1 + τ
τ
· ∂s∗
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
− 1
NF
)]
.
Utilizing (??), (??), and (??), we obtain
(1 + τ)
∂s
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
=
1 + τ
τ
· ∂s∗
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
= S ′(n0).
Therefore,
∂pi0
∂n0
∣∣∣∣
n0=n0∗
s=s∗=n0/NF
=
(e− c)(1 + τ 2)
σ(1 + τ)2n0
[
S ′(n0)− 1
NF
]
. (33)
Thus, we can conclude that
∂pi0
∂n0
>
<
0 ⇐⇒ S ′(n0) >
<
1
NF
(34)
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holds for any pair (s, n0) where the curve s = S(n0) and the dotted line
s = n0/NF intersects in Figure 1. Similarly, we can show that
∂pi1
∂n1
>
<
0 ⇐⇒ S ′(n0) >
<
1
NF
(35)
holds for that pair.
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium con-
figurations as follows: In order for a configuration to be a Nash equilibrium,
it must be impossible for a software firm to switch networks and increase its
profit.
In case A, the graph of S(n0) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1. Thus, there
are three equilibrium candidates; (n0 = n1 = NF/2), (n
0 = NF , n
1 = 0), and
(n0 = 0, n1 = NF ). Since
S(n0)
 > n
0/NF if 0 < n
0 < NF/2,
< n0/NF if NF/2 < n
0 < NF ,
and S ′
(
NF
2
)
<
1
NF
, (36)
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n0 = n1 = n0∗ = n
1
∗ =
NF/2) is stable in a Nash equilibrium sense.
On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
S(n0)
 < n
0/NF if n
0 < NF/2,
> n0/NF if n
0 > NF/2,
and S ′
(
NF
2
)
≥ 1
NF
. (37)
Therefore, only two equilibria, (n0 = n0∗ = NF , n
1 = n1∗ = 0) and (n
0 = n0∗ =
19
0, n1 = n1∗ = NF ), are stable.
1516
Finally, in case B, the graph of S(n0) is drawn as curve B and it is
apparent from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n0 =
n1 = n0∗ = n
1
∗ = NF/2), (n
0 = n0∗ = NF , n
1 = n1∗ = 0), and (n
0 = n0∗ =
0, n1 = n1∗ = NF ), are stable. So, we have the following lemma:
Lemma: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases
emerge:
Case A: If t ≥ t¯, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists, (n0 = n1 = n0∗ =
n1∗ = NF/2).
Case B: If t¯ > t > t, three equilibria, (n0 = n1 = n0∗ = n
1
∗ = NF/2), (n
0 =
n0∗ = NF , n
1 = n1∗ = 0), and (n
0 = n0∗ = 0, n
1 = n1∗ = NF ), exist.
Case C: If t ≤ t, only two equilibria, (n0 = n0∗ = NF , n1 = n1∗ = 0) and
(n0 = n0∗ = 0, n
1 = n1∗ = NF ), exist.
There is one important thing to note about the effect of deeper market
integration: the gradient of S(n0) in the neighborhood of the symmetric
equilibrium is increased, and this change tends to make the symmetric equi-
librium less stable. Figure 1 suggests that deeper market integration, by
15It can be easily shown that the symmetric equilibrium candidate is not a Nash equi-
librium even if S′(NF /2) is equal to 1/NF which corresponds to the case of t = t.
16In the interval of n0 where S(n0) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal
consumer in each country is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line s = n0/NF .
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intensifying indirect network effects, increases the extent to which a given
number of software varieties is consistent with hardware/software standard-
ization.
4 The Impact of Market Integration
Now let us turn to the impact of deeper market integration (i.e., a gradual
decrease in trade costs for software products).17 A reduction in intermarket
trade costs (i.e., a larger τ) implies one basic change: the effective number of
software varieties, (1 + τ)nh, becomes larger. This implies that an integrated
market can make access to software products easier.18 Since consumers prefer
to consume a wide variety of software products, deeper market integration
might result in gains from easier access to software products. However, we
have to check the changes in the variety of hardware.
Figure 2 traces out equilibrium values of nh as functions of the level of
intermarket trade costs. At high values of t, the symmetric equilibrium is
unique and both systems exist. As t drops below level t¯, hardware (and
software) standardization (i.e., only one type of hardware remains) becomes
sustainable. For trade costs below t, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
17The case of a move from a closed economy to full trade liberalization is discussed in
Iwasa and Kikuchi (2008).
18Note that the total number of software varieties remained unchanged as 2NF .
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Let us suppose a secular fall in intermarket trade costs. From an initial
position in which two technologies coexist, hardware standardization spon-
taneously arises through a process of intensified indirect network effects. In
what follows, to highlight the interaction between deeper market integration
and software provision, let us examine the following two representative cases.
4.1 The Case of Hardware Differentiation
In what follows, t (resp. t′) indicates trade costs before (resp. after) integra-
tion. Let us assume that the following condition is satisfied:
t > t′ ≥ t¯. (38)
Note that this condition holds when the degree of hardware differentiation
(k) is relatively large (or the degree to which indirect network effects exist is
relatively low). In this case, two types of hardware remain during the process
of market integration. Thus, no consumer changes his or her hardware and
market integration induces an effectively large number of software varieties
for each type of hardware. From (??) and (??), this clearly increases every
consumer’s utility.
Proposition 1: Given that condition (??) holds, both types of hardware
remain in equilibrium and both countries gain from deeper market integration.
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4.2 The Case of Hardware Standardization
Next, let us assume that the following condition is satisfied:
t > t ≥ t′. (39)
In this case, while both types of hardware may exist before integration, only
one type of hardware remains after integration. In other words, intensified
indirect network effects result in a reduced number of hardware varieties (2
rather than 1).
This can be interpreted as follows. An increased number of effective soft-
ware varieties intensifies indirect network effects, which induces consumers
to choose hardware that has had the largest amount of software written for
it. Due to these changes, software firms change their software provision deci-
sion: all software firms choose to write software for a single type of hardware.
Then, the demand for other types of hardware vanishes.
For simplicity, let us suppose that only Hardware 1 remains after market
integration. In this case, there are some consumers who have to switch from
Hardware 0 to Hardware 1 if the symmetric equilibrium was realized before
integration. While there are gains from the increased diversity of software
available, there are losses from switching to the other network.
Let us consider the marginal case where a sufficiently small decrease in
trade costs occurs around t. The change in the indirect utility of a type-s
23
consumer who switches to the other network is:19
∆V (s) =
[21/(σ−1) − 1][(1 + t1−σ)NF ]1/(σ−1)(e− c)(σ − 1)
21/(σ−1)bσ
− k(1− 2s). (40)
Note that the first term on the RHS represents the gains from software diver-
sification while the second term on the RHS represents costs from increased
disutility. Let us define a type-s˜ consumer who is indifferent to switching
hardware as follows:
s˜ =
1
2
− [2
1/(σ−1) − 1][(1 + t1−σ)NF ]1/(σ−1)(e− c)(σ − 1)
2σ/(σ−1)kbσ
=
1
2
− [2
1/(σ−1) − 1]N¯1/(σ−1)(e− c)(σ − 1)
2σ/(σ−1)kbσ
=
1
2
− [2
1/(σ−1) − 1](σ − 1)
4
, (41)
where use has been made of the definitions t = [NF/(N¯ −NF )]1/(σ−1) and
N¯ = 2[kbσ/2(e− c)]σ−1. Note that (??) is positive for ∀σ > 2 and goes to
1/2 − (ln 2)/4 as σ → ∞.20 Now we can state the possibility of losses from
market integration.
19Note that, in the case of hardware standardization, the number of software varieties
for Hardware 1 increases from 2n1 to 4n1 (or from NF to 2NF ).
20(??) can be rewritten as [1 − ψ(σ)](σ + 1)/4, where ψ(σ) ≡ 21/(σ−1)(σ − 1)/(σ + 1).
Then, ψ(2) = 2/3 and
ψ′(σ) =
21/(σ−1)(2− ln 2)
(σ − 1)(σ + 1)2
(
σ − 2 + ln 2
2− ln 2
)
.
Clearly, the derivative is positive (negative) if σ is greater (smaller) than (2+ln 2)/(2−ln 2).
It is also clear that limσ→∞ ψ(σ) = 1. Based on the above, we can conclude that s˜ is
positive for ∀σ > 2.
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Proposition 2: If a sufficiently small decrease in trade costs occurs around
t and Hardware 1 (resp. 0) dominates the integrated market, both countries’
consumers who are located at s ∈ [0, s˜] (resp. t ∈ [1− s˜, 1]) are made worse
off by deeper market integration.
This implies that trade liberalization leads some consumers to “switch”
to an other-dominated brand, thereby increasing disutility. Note that this
case is in distinct contrast to the cases of universal gains from trade, which
are emphasized in the literature. We would like to stress that deeper market
integration, which forms the basis for easier access to software products (i.e.,
intensified indirect network effects), may work as a catalyst for Pareto inferior
outcomes.
5 Concluding Remarks
Both deeper market integration and advances in digital technology have
driven particularly large decreases in the costs of intermarket software pro-
vision. In this note, we first explained the mechanism of how trade costs
influence the software provision decision of software firms. Then, we in-
vestigated the transformation of production/trade patterns given gradually
decreasing trade costs for software products. It is shown that, if two in-
compatible types of hardware exist, deeper market integration may reduce
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the variety of hardware technologies. It is also shown that, if the variety of
hardware technologies is reduced by deeper integration, some consumers are
made worse off (Proposition 2). In other words, deeper market integration,
which forms the basis for easier access to software products, may work as a
catalyst for Pareto inferior outcomes.
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully, it provides
a useful paradigm for considering how deeper market integration affects both
the structure of software provision and intermarket trade patterns.
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